JavaScript

This version of Chrome incorporates version 9.3 of the V8 JavaScript engine. It specifically includes the changes listed below. You can find a complete list of recent features in the V8 release notes.

Object.hasOwn

Object.hasOwn, a new boolean property, provides an easier-to-use, static method version of Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.

Deprecations, and Removals

This version of Chrome introduces the deprecations and removals listed below. Visit ChromeStatus.com for lists of current deprecations and previous removals.

Block ports 989 and 990

Connections to HTTP, HTTPS or FTP servers on ports 989 and 990 now fail. These ports are used by the FTPS protocol, which has never been implemented in Chrome. However, FTPS servers can be attacked in a cross-protocol attack by malicious web pages using carefully-crafted HTTPS requests. This is a mitigation for the ALPACA attack.

Remove 3DES in TLS

Chrome has now removed support for the TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite. TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA is a remnant of the SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0 era. 3DES in transport layer security (TLS) is vulnerable to the Sweet32 attack. Being a CBC cipher suite, it is also vulnerable to the Lucky Thirteen attack. The first replacement AES cipher suites were defined for TLS in RFC3268, published around 19 years ago, and there have been several iterations since.

WebAssembly Cross-Origin Module Sharing

WebAssembly module sharing between cross-origin but same-site environments will be deprecated to allow agent clusters to be scoped to origins long term. This follows a WebAssembly specification change, which has an impact on the platform as well.



Keeping Chrome users safe as they browse the web is crucially important to Chrome; in fact, security has always been one of our four core principles. In some cases, security can come at the expense of performance. In our next post in The Fast and the Curious series, we are excited to share how improvements to our phishing detection algorithms keeps users safe online. With these improvements, phishing detection is now 50 times faster and drains less battery.

Phishing detection

Every time you navigate to a new page, Chrome evaluates a collection of signals about the page to see if it matches those of phishing sites. To do that, we compare the color profile of the visited page - that’s the range and frequency of the colors present on the page - with the color profiles of common pages. For example in the image below, we can see that the colors are mostly orange, followed by green and then a touch of purple.





If the site matches a known phishing site, Chrome warns you to protect your personal information and prevent you from exposing your credentials.



What you will see if a phishing attempt is detected

To preserve your privacy, by default Chrome's Safe Browsing mode never sends any images outside the browser. While this is great for privacy, it means that your machine has to do all the work to analyze the image.

Image processing can often generate heavy workloads because analyzing the image requires an evaluation of each pixel in what is commonly known as a “pixel loop.” Some modern monitors display upwards of 14 million pixels, so even simple operations on each of those pixels can add up to a lot of CPU use! For phishing detection, the operation that takes place on each pixel is the counting of its basic colors.

Here is what this looks like. The counts are stored in an associative data structure called a hashmap. For each pixel, we extract its RGB color values and store the counts in one of 3 different hashmaps -- one for each color.





Making it more efficient

Adding one item to a hashmap is fast, but we have to do this for millions of pixels. We try to avoid reducing the number of pixels to avoid compromising the quality of the analysis. However, the computation itself can be improved.

Our improvements to the pipeline look like this:
  • The code now avoids keeping track of RGB channels in three different hashmaps and instead uses only one to index by color. Three times less counting!
  • Consecutive pixels are summed before being counted in the hashmap. For a site with a uniform background color, this can reduce the hashmap overhead to almost nothing.
Here is what the counting of the colors looks like now. Notice how there are significantly fewer operations on the hashmap:





How much faster did this get?

Starting with M92, Chrome now executes image-based phishing classification up to 50 times faster at the 50th percentile and 2.5 times faster at the 99th percentile. On average, users will get their phishing classification results after 100 milliseconds, instead of 1.8 seconds.

This benefits you in two ways as you use Chrome. First and foremost, using less CPU time to achieve the same work improves general performance. Less CPU time means less battery drain and less time with spinning fans.

Second, getting the results faster means Chrome can warn you earlier. The optimization brought the percentage of requests that took more than 5 seconds to process from 16.25% to less than 1.6%. This speed improvement makes a real difference in security - especially when it comes to stopping you from entering your password in a malicious site!

Overall, these changes achieve a reduction of almost 1.2% of the total CPU time used by all Chrome renderer processes and utility processes.

At Chrome’s scale, even minor algorithm improvements can result in major energy efficiency gains in aggregate. Here’s to many more centuries of CPU time saved!

Stay tuned for many more performance improvements to come!

Posted by Olivier Li Shing Tat-Dupuis, Chrome Developer

Data source for all statistics: Real-world data anonymously aggregated from Chrome clients.



When a browser connects to websites over HTTPS (vs. HTTP), eavesdroppers and attackers on the network can't intercept or alter the data that's shared over that connection (including personal info, or even the page itself). This level of privacy and security is vital for the web ecosystem, so Chrome continues to invest in making HTTPS more widely supported.

Thankfully, HTTPS adoption has come a long way in recent years, and most operating systems now see 90%+ of page loads over HTTPS in Chrome. Still, there's more we can do to help make HTTPS the preferred protocol on the web, and better protect users on the remaining slice of the web that doesn’t yet support HTTPS, so today we're sharing some future work in this area.



Opting in to an HTTPS-First World


Beginning in M94, Chrome will offer HTTPS-First Mode, which will attempt to upgrade all page loads to HTTPS and display a full-page warning before loading sites that don’t support it. Users who enable this mode gain confidence that Chrome is connecting them to sites over HTTPS whenever possible, and that they will see a warning before connecting to sites over HTTP. Based on ecosystem feedback, we’ll explore making HTTPS-First mode the default for all users in the future. Mozilla has also shared their intent to make HTTPS-only mode the future of web browsing in Firefox.



Experimenting with the lock icon

As we approach an HTTPS-first future, we're also re-examining the lock icon that browsers typically show when a site loads over HTTPS. In particular, our research indicates that users often associate this icon with a site being trustworthy, when in fact it's only the connection that's secure. In a recent study, we found that only 11% of participants could correctly identify the meaning of the lock icon. To try and reduce this confusion, Chrome will run an experiment in M93 that replaces the lock in the address bar with a more neutral entry point to Page Info (example below). We hope that this experiment will improve the discoverability of critical privacy and security information and controls provided in Page Info, such as site permissions. Importantly, a "Not Secure" indicator will continue to show on sites without HTTPS support, and the experiment includes an enterprise policy in case organizations want to opt-out. In all cases, we'll provide advance notice if we decide to move ahead with a full launch.





Protecting users on the HTTP web


While we are excited to see users adopt HTTPS-First Mode in future versions of Chrome, HTTP connections will still continue to be supported and Chrome will take additional steps to protect and inform users whenever they are using insecure connections. Continuing from our past efforts to restrict new features to secure origins and deprecate powerful features on insecure origins, we’ll evaluate a broad set of web platform features to determine if they should be limited or restricted on HTTP webpages.

In order to focus on changes that provide the greatest security improvements to our users, we are relying on a set of guiding principles to prioritize our future work in this area:

  • Better inform users when making trust decisions about sites over insecure connections
  • Limit the ability for sites to opt out of security policies over insecure connections
  • Restrict how, and for how long, Chrome stores site content provided over insecure connections
A deeper explanation of how we plan to act on these principles, as well as an updated list of affected features will be maintained on the Chromium wiki and we are excited to announce more details later this year.

Posted by Shweta Panditrao, Devon O'Brien, Emily Stark, Google Chrome team